Abstract
This article reinterprets Mali’s jihadist insurgency through the analytical framework of neoclassical realism, challenging portrayals of Islamist groups as mainly ideological actors. It argues that movements such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and JNIM behave as rational, power-seeking agents that translate systemic pressures—regional anarchy, state collapse, and foreign intervention—into adaptive policies. Drawing on field studies and secondary analyses, the study traces four phases of jihadist adaptation: initial coalition building during the 2012 rebellion; strategic retrenchment after the French intervention; social embedding and governance between 2013 and 2020; and post-2020 recalibration under the shifting balance of power following the arrival of Russian-backed forces. Religious ideology emerges not as an irrational driver but as a mediating variable that converts belief into political legitimacy, enabling authority where material capacity is scarce. By integrating realist theory with the sociology of Islam in Mali, the paper develops the concept of religious realism—a hybrid logic in which faith provides moral coherence while realism furnishes political functionality. This synthesis helps explain the paradoxical endurance of Jihadist governance and its ability to survive systemic shocks through symbolic, rather than material, power.
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